Crossing the Boundary to East Asian:

A Political Context Analysis of Female Labor

Policy-Making in Taiwan

Ma Tsai-Chuan
Department of Labor Relations, Chung-Chang University.
No.168, Sec. 1, Daxue Rd., Minxiong Township, Chiayi County 621, Taiwan (R.O.C.)
E-mail: labtma@ccu.edu.tw

Yu-Ching Yeh (corresponding author)
Department of Early Childhood Education, Chiayi University.
85 Wen-lung tsun., Min-shiung., Chiayi 621, Taiwan, R. O. C.
E-mail: ycyeh@mail.nctu.edu.tw

(Received: 12-04-2011 / Accepted: 29-04-2011)

Abstract
This study examines the political context in female labor policy domain of Taiwan. What state and pressure groups are deployed and negotiated to achieve their collective interests in the diverse levels of institutional investigations. The discussion combines the institutional system of structure and agency in a systematic discussion of the policymaking. At the national level, it is important to note that the relationship between dependency and distribution of resources may be structuralized; however, they are not permanently fixed in the policy events, which have to be understood in dynamic terms. Policy outcome is determined by the dynamic interaction between institutional structures and the behavior of policy actors. The resources of organizational actors and their reciprocal relationships would be changed across the events in the diverse policy stages. Different forms of organizational interactions among the female organizational actors will mutually influence their choices, which affect the outcomes of labor events policy decision-making. Basing on the Gender Equality in Employment Act case study indicates the organizational involvements and
network linkages between various female organizations and relevant organizations. Overall, the state has designed the strategic coordination of the various institutional pathways in order to incorporate the female pressure groups into the governance structure in Taiwan.

**Keywords:** Institutional System, Resource Exchange, the Gender Equality in Employment Act, Governance Structure.

### The Nature of the State

The role of the state has been widely discussed in contemporary political sociology. The nature of the state can be traced back to traditional sociological analysis, as Weber’s (1920) political perspective was guided by the principle of the primacy of the interests of the state and what the state possesses in both empirical and theoretical terms. Durkheim (1912) emphasized the role of the state as the ‘organ of moral discipline’, used to regulate and order social behaviors. In Marx’s (1867) demonstration, the state is seen as an accomplice of the bourgeoisie and thus as helping to shape the dominant structure of society. Marxists have alleged that all capitalist states are fundamentally alike, no matter what differences may exist between them in the mode of governance, the organization of their bureaucracies, or their policies they promulgate (Jessop, 1982; Carnoy, 1984).

These diverse approaches also define the formation of the state in different ways, for instance, the economic anthropologist, Godelier (1980) focuses on the relationship of domination and legitimacy in processing the formation of the state. Bottomore (1993) reminds us that the state has flourished because of two factors which provided a most favorable environment for the development of capitalism—a stable, well-organized political system, together with a rational and effectively administered body of law. The state apparatus is associated with the development of capitalism, and the nation state has been extremely successful in terms of increasing both wealth and power.

### Analytical Models of the Role of the State

In terms of the concept of state development, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish the boundaries between the state and civil society, especially considering their mutual penetration throughout history. Greenberg and Mayer’s (1990) analytical model may be of use; they constructed three models to analyze the role of the state in modern society. These were ‘the citizen-responsive state model’, ‘the capitalist state model’, and ‘the state-centered model’.

*The citizen-responsive state model* asserts that the state is a reflection of the
popular will or the general interest and policy outcomes are decided by the transmission of mechanisms at many different stages (Dahl, 1963; Carnoy, 1984; Greenberg and Mayer, 1990). They recognize that the outcomes of the policymaking stages are determined by the mechanisms of interaction and conflict between the state and pressure groups. The mechanisms of interaction of the state as Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987: 46-47) argued, may be that of a ‘mediator, balancer and harmonizer of differing societal interests’ and thus we can envisage public policy as the aggregation of diverse pressure groups’ activities within the state apparatus.

Meanwhile the capitalist state model emphasizes the deep structure, class divisions and the domination of the capitalist class as being fundamentally and inescapably inscribed upon the nature of the state. This complex model contains three approaches as follows. First, the instrumentalist approach, as shown by Miliband (1977), stipulates that the dominant capitalist class has both the need and the resources to influence the state to do its bidding. Secondly, the structuralist approach, as shown by Poulantzas (1973), asserts that the state reflects the systematic and inescapable needs of capitalism because the role of the state is to ensure the reproduction of capitalism and the social relations of production. Primarily, Poulantzas provides the concept of ‘relative autonomy’ which indicates how the state adjusts itself to the structure to work out its contradictions and to protect the long-term interests of Capitalism. Moreover, the debate between Miliband and Poulantzas simultaneously falls into the trap of determinism and makes it impossible for those theoretical frameworks to consider realistically ‘the dialectical relationship’ between the state and Capitalism. Thirdly, the struggle approach, provided by Gold and Wright (1975) and Esping-Andersen (1985), the development of the state excludes the capitalist class and state actors, and it is important to emphasize the working class are strongly involved in political mobilization and take a concrete form in the policy of the state.

By contrast, the state-centered model argues that the state is an independent and powerful entity, capable not only of holding off powerful social forces, but of imposing its own vision and goals upon them (Greeberg and Mayer, 1990). In Rhodes and Dunleavy’s (1995) view, the Westminster model of government suggests that the state has absolute authority to execute the top-down aspects of the policy decision-making process in the United Kingdom. Here, the state is foremost the dominant organizer of society, in fact, these phenomena apparently emerged in the NICs countries and indicated that the universal East Asian model of strong state-led development has attracted widespread attention.

The Myth of the Powerless State
Under the historical development of the welfare state, we can see that the state has played a leading role in the historical construction of the welfare state in Western society. O'Connor’s (1973) and Gough’s (1979) discussions, the contradictions of the welfare state are produced by its development in the context of the capitalist mode of production. How have the challenges generated by modern trends come to influence the role of the state? Poulantzas’s (1981) discussion paid attention to the relationship between the state and civil society. In Jessop’s (1994), Hirst and Thompson’s (1995) and Castells’ (1996) studies, the state apparatus plays a significant role in their theoretical demonstrations. These writers’ theoretical constructions focus on the market of capitalism, claiming that if the market generates an unstable order, it appears that the state has a deficient ability to effectively manipulate its systematic operations. Therefore, the role of the state can be seen as are generating an adaptive mode of adjustment so that the state can be involved in the emergence of new relationships with civil society, which grants the latter a greater role and makes the policymaking process more ‘mediated’ than before.

In Jessop (1990) acknowledged, there may be a ‘plurality of institutions’, always seeking multiple objectives and frequently facing internal and external conflicts. A theoretical construction was provided by Jessop (1990) who offered a successful systematic synthesis of Poulantzas’s (1973, 1978) structural approach and Luhmann’s (1984) systematic approach in his theoretical demonstration. Jessop (1990) indicated the state and society mutually exist in some defining structure and the state has a ‘strategic selectivity’ which depends on the specific circumstances. In this context, Jessop carefully integrates Luhmann’s theoretical construction between the system and space-time. Jessop believes that the proper object of our study of the state is not ‘the state itself’, but rather ‘state projects’, that is, political undertakings which have as their intended outcome ‘state effects’. Therefore, the effectiveness of the state’s power depends ultimately upon the balance of forces in any given situation.

In addition, Jessop (1989) indicated that there is no subsystem which can over-determine the other subsystems, and every subsystem is self-referential and structurally coupled. The state apparatus is form-determined and has different internal sectors and mechanisms, rather than being a coherent whole when in operation. The principle of interaction between hierarchical subsystems depends on internal rules and experiences which interact with various external circumstances. There is no single calculating subject; we are faced with a plurality of calculating subjects and a plethora of competing and contradictory strategies. In Jessop’s view, whether the state is

---

1 In Jessop’s (1990: 256) construction, the concept of ‘strategic selectivity’ brings out the state’s differential impact upon the balance of political forces and the strategies which they can pursue; therefore, the state has strategic selectivity to reflect and modify the balance of class forces.

2 In this perspective, Jessop is explicitly influenced by Foucault’s ideas, as he recognizes that
autonomous or not is an empirical question, but it appears that the state is potentially autonomous, however, and its form and function reflect the outcome of past strategic struggles. He calls this a ‘strategic selectivity’ approach to achieving strategic coordination with the state.

We seek to trace the state’s power and its capacity to manipulate its sources, as well as how the state to maintain the global impact and transformation of supporting the modern market economy. Weiss (1995) argued that the relative strength of states has been and continues to be one of the major mechanisms for determining the comparative industrial positions of countries within the international economy. Moreover, the strongest states have a high level of ‘penetrative-extractive power’ which can be used to formulate their ‘negotiated capacity’. The latter generates a form of autonomy which is embedded in the process of coordination (Weiss, 1998). In addition, Weiss (1998) has investigated the development of Japan, and NICs, using the Swedish and German models, and provides further evidence that the state can resolve many of its important problems of coordination better than the market by virtue of reducing its ‘transaction costs’ in the wider economy. However, the state as such is not the only source of its own transformational capacity. From historical structural investigations, Weiss strongly disagrees that states appear powerless in responding to ‘international change’ and that the power of state will gradually weaken along with ‘global forces’ in the development of globalization. Therefore, the ability of coordination becomes a useful strategy with which to establish the stable mechanisms and avoid internal conflicts in the modern state.

Pressure Groups as a Political Construction

The concept of ‘pressure groups’ in theoretical constructions emerged from the work of earlier theorists, such as Bentley (1908), Truman (1951) and Latham (1952). In addition, there exists a long-standing and symbiotic relationship between diverse pressure groups and the state. These group theorists saw all policies, however derived, as essentially the outcome of compromise and negotiation between the conflicting interests of competing public sectors or social groups. Moreover, Olson (1965) asserted that rational, self-interested individuals would not act to achieve their common or group interests. It is obvious that this explanation for group institutions are not determined by structure but agency, through actors’ strategic production. In contrast, the strategic selectivity approach indicates more intentional political actions. Therefore, the state’s power is specific to the situation and generates balanced outcomes.

3 Poulantzas’s (1978) term ‘structural selectivity’ reflects the process and outcome of class struggle. However, in Jessop’s (1982, 1990) theory, he constructs the idea of ‘strategic selectivity’ as an alternative concept to structural selectivity.

4 Weiss (1998:9) indicated that the state enhanced its infrastructural capacities to penetrate civil society and extracted resources to construct the negotiated capacity to mobilize and coordinate social energy.
mobilization rests on the idea of selective benefits, as a ‘free-rider’ can be expected to secure the benefits obtained by the group without providing any contributions.

The relationship between the central government and pressure groups, in Baggott’s (1995) analysis, indicates that some relevant organizations depend highly on public funding and resources. Moreover, pressure groups ordinarily base on their membership, aims, ways of operating and relationships upon the government (Jordan and Richardson, 1987; Baggott, 1995). The internal disputes within pressure groups will disorganize the collective construction of diverse social groups. Some of these disputes indicate that pressure groups have a multiple promotional character in the process of policymaking. These diverse discussions provide a framework with which to consider the possible influence of these limitations of pressure groups.

**Theoretical Disputes about the Pressure Groups**

The focal point of Dahl’s (1982) politically theoretical construction is whether the diverse relationships of the social dimension can reflect the political structure or not. Some researchers, they see pluralists as suggesting that power is distributed evenly and asserting that the role of the state is neutral. In the light of a recognized shift in thinking in Pluralism, Lindblom (1977) and Dahl (1982) have reinterpreted the pluralist perspective in the form of Neo-Pluralism. In a similar context, Crouch and Marquand (1995) suggest that Pluralism offers the prospect of a politics of coalition-building, whereas in contrast, the object of collective action is to empower individuals, to foster autonomy, to facilitate personal growth and self-realization. By thus modifying the pluralists’ principles, Neo-Pluralism attempts to cut the state down to size and to force this modern Leviathan to share its power with other groups in the modern polity and economy, as well as to maintain a separation of power within the state apparatus itself. However, in Held’s (1997) view, Lindblom and Dahl would also need to accept the constraints imposed upon Western governments and state institutions because of the requirements of private accumulation, which systematically limit policy options.

In the power structural dimension, Pluralism makes a basic mistake in predicting the balance of opportunities and strengths. As Bacharch and Baratz’s (1963) criticism shows, by no means every individual or organization can express their interests in the policymaking process. The more powerful individuals and organizations are able to shape the political institution, emphasizing the value of community, and they can manipulate the procedure to constrain the boundaries of

---

5 This is based on Olson’s (1965) crucial distinction between selective and collective benefits: selective benefits accrue only to members of the organization, while, collective benefits accrue to both members and nonmembers.
policy issues to their aim safety and advantage (Bacharch and Baratz, 1963: Ham and Hill, 1985). Consequently, the pluralists have underestimated the difficulties faced by group organizations, especially the latent pressure groups.

In contrast, the theoretical argument between Miliband and Poulantzas uses the concept of relative autonomy to discuss the disjunction between ‘economic power and political power’. These two forms of power became institutionally separate from one another in the capitalist concept. However, in Poggi’s (2001: 138) view, economic power emerges as a distinct form of social power, relatively self-standing with respect to political power, and typically constituted, rather than existing through visible hierarchies of command and obedience. The different degree of structural constraints in these various theoretical demonstrations has a similar influence upon the theorists’ different levels of acceptance of the concept of pluralist-style pressure politics.

The Coalitions and Limitations of Pressure Groups

The nature of pressure groups is based on the cohesion of universal interests between diverse individuals. Their aims are to focus on how to influence the policy outcomes and cope with the other pressure groups’ interests. As we saw above, earlier policy research was often influenced by the policy cycle framework (Easton, 1965) or the analysis of stages, for example Jordan and Richardson’s (1987) work on the staged strategic development of pressure groups.

We can draw upon Dahl’s (1971) ideas and demonstrations about the possible factors determining the leap from beliefs to political action. The exploration of the ‘advocacy coalition’ framework in policy domain constructed by Sabatier (1986). Sabatier’s (1998:477) model predicts that in a policy subsystem there will be an advocacy coalition of multiple interest groups, competing for influence over the decision-making process. The conflicting strategies of the various sides of the coalition are normally mediated by a third group of actors, which he termed ‘policy brokers’, and their principal concern is to find some reasonable compromise that will reduce the intense conflicts. The role of the policy broker is the same as that of bridgers or mediators in the oppositional model of structural relationships in the network system. Brokers (bridgers) have a prominent role in buffering the process of policymaking and harmonizing internal conflicts between diverse sectors within the policy subsystem.

However, Parsons (1995) criticized the advocacy coalition model for being less appropriate to those political systems with a tradition of greater centralization, both in terms of the territorial distribution of power and the political and administrative arrangements at the level of national politics, government and administration. Therefore, Sabatier’s theoretical construction has little to say on the
question of where this model of the policymaking process stands in relation to theories of ‘power’. Moreover, Sabatier is dismissive of the systematic raw political power in the policymaking process because he believes that, in the long run, policy learning has a greater capacity to change the agendas and decision-making process of governments than it has to change the exercise of power.

The study of Haggard and Kaufman (1995) found some other dimensions of difference in the organizational capabilities of pressure groups. In terms of the developing countries, such assumptions seem to be misguided; organization does not follow from shared economic interests alone. Therefore, the other limitations of pressure groups concern the institutional mechanisms through which interests are translated into policy. Most coalitional models of politics rest on the idea of aggregation rules, or decision-making mechanisms such as lobbying, voting or even the capture of office. There are different pathways that exist between the activities of pressure groups, and these differences have a significant relation to the absence of an effective democratic polity. By and large, high levels of inequality in the developing countries imply that different sectors are likely to have very different organizational capacities. The flexibility of space and time creates divergent adaptable relations between the hierarchical governmental system, legislators and pressure groups.

The Emergence of Collective Action in Taiwan

The emergence of collective action in civil society is related to the shifting and releasing of governance structures in the development of the state. By contrast, the empowerment of social forces allows the effective integration and divergent strategies of involvement to have an impact upon the limited social and political space in latter period of Taiwan. Therefore, this study tries to map out how and why the restructuration between the state and the involvement of social forces occurred in female labor policy in the later stages of Taiwan.

We concentrate on the development and strategic actions of female labor-issue organizations and how they were able to have an impact by virtue of integrating with the relevant organizations in the process of female labor policymaking. Through an empirical investigation of the prominent female labor law in the Gender Equality in Employment Act, we trace the contextual involvement and interactions within female labor organizations and examine how they overcome their internal and external limitations to integrate with various organizations to involve in female labor policymaking.
The Empirical Investigation of Female Labor Policy

The earlier authoritarian party-state of Taiwan has planned and exercised long-term dominance across the political, economic and social systems; however, since the ending of Martial Law (in 1987) as an institutional release, female organizations have become empowered and have articulated their intentional influences to civil society. In the historical labor process, female workers became a low waged and highly recruited labor force in the labor market structure of Taiwan (Chang, 1995; Yan, 1996). The structure of women’s labor and political level participation shows that the unequal structures of labor and political participation may have weakened the empowerment of female labor organizations in terms of their possibilities for political construction.

Table 1 shows that Taiwan’s female labor participation rate in comparison with that of other developed industrial countries, was relatively low from 1994 to 1997.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th>Korea</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>44.80</td>
<td>52.00</td>
<td>47.40</td>
<td>48.40</td>
<td>50.70</td>
<td>55.60</td>
<td>45.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>45.34</td>
<td>52.80</td>
<td>48.30</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>58.90</td>
<td>48.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In a capitalist society, the central government faces the decision of how to operate a regulative mechanism to tackle the dilemma of female workers between participating in the labor market and doing domestic work. In order to assist the promotion of economic development, the strategies of the state focused on how to draw female workers into the labor market and supply the deficient labor force to cope with the industrial development of Taiwan.

The continuous patriarchal structural constraints upon female labor market participation after the ending of Martial Law. The economic depression of Eastern Asian countries led to many enterprises going bankrupt and the large-scale retirement
of workers from the labor market which intensified the marginalization of female workers in the labor market. In addition, the extensive industrial structure meant that female workers continue played a significant role in the labor market. However, the state and the capitalists did not promote female labor conditions in the different dimensions of the labor market. For instance, as Table 2 shows us, the unequal wage structure that existed between female and male workers in different occupations, meant that the overall wage of female workers was on average 71.6% that of male workers, and that the more physical labor (low skill) that was involved in an occupation, the more discrepant the wage structure of its labor market.

Table 2  A Comparison of Wage Structure (in Pounds /Per Month) for Men and Women in Different Occupations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations Gender</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Manager</th>
<th>Professional</th>
<th>Technicians</th>
<th>Salesmen</th>
<th>Skilled Workers</th>
<th>Agricultural Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>1135</td>
<td>1009</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate (%)</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Directorate General of Budgets, Accounts & Statistics, the Executive Yuan, 2006.

The liberal strategy of the state allowed a competition which emerges between the female workers and the capitalists in the free market. The liberal strategy created more extensive exploitation of lower skilled female workers by the capitalists in the competitive labor market. For instance, the phenomenon shows the higher density of female labor persecution in the labor market and the light forms of punishment (ranging from £37 to £370) given to the capitalists who disobey the Labor Standardization Law (The Daily United News, 1998). These institutional promotions urgently require the intervention of the central government through legislative process to make progresses in female labor policy. However, the state did not make any interventions into the labor market to urge the capitalists to adjust the unequal wage structure.

In addition, the empirical investigation shows that there was a low level of employment of female workers in the second wave of the labor market. This situation was bound by the patriarchal structure which constrained female workers in their domestic work. Therefore, these patriarchal constraints reduced the motivation of female workers to reenter the labor market. According to the data of the Council

---

6 There is 33.46% female workers retired from the labor market due to marriage or pregnancy. The proportion of these retirements caused by marriage is 25% and those by childbirth are 45.39% (the Council Labor Association, 1993).
Labor Association (1997), the ‘M-Curve’ model 7 (which indicates similar rates of the first and second waves of female labor participation) does not appear to be relevant to the female Taiwanese labor employment market. These constraints fit with Walby’s (1990) view that patriarchy constructed by the structural constraints the participation of women in both the labor market.

The demonstration of Mies (1998) showed the structuralization of capitalism-patriarchy is displayed within the social and political structure. This study indicates that these structural restrictions also resulted for the following reasons in Taiwan. Firstly, the socially supportive system and legislation of the central government did not provide for children and the aged in its care program. Secondly, the unequal employment structure, for example in terms of opportunities, promotion chances, and the forbiddance of marriage and pregnancy clause, existed universally across the labor markets of Taiwan. Thirdly, the lack of established occupational training programs provides assistance for those who were temporarily retired from the labor market due to marriage and childbirth. Fourth, the lack of nursery services shows that the central government did not positively establish a sound system of child-care provision to reduce the burden of childcare for female workers. After maternity leave, the patriarchal structure of the labor market also prevented female workers from re-entering it because of their ‘original duty’ of childcare. Finally, the central government did not prepare flexible part-time work to encourage once more the participation of female workers into the labor market.

On the other hand, the patriarchal traditions focus on the obligations of women toward the family, and these moral factors formulate the patriarchy and keep married female workers as domestic workers. The state itself was implicated in more general processes of patriarchal domination, constructing, reflecting and perpetuating gender hierarchies and inequities (Howell, 1998). By virtue of the structural distributions of women within the hierarchical central government, we can examine how the state arranged the rights of female workers. Table 3 shows a complete discrepancy in the rates of middle and high-ranking occupational levels, which show the governmental bureaucracy does not construct equal channels and opportunities for female labor participation in the bureaucratic system.

Table 3 Male and Female Official Work in the Central Governmental Sectors: Rates of Official Ranking (1991-1996)

7 The Council Labor Association Statistical Report (1997) indicated that the second wave of female employment is less than in some European countries, such as Demark, Norways and Germony, in terms of the participation in labor markets.
Year | Gender | Temporary Worker | Low-Rank Worker | Middle-Rank Worker | High-Rank Worker
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1991 | Male | 10.24 | 61.74 | 25.42 | 2.61
     | Female | 6.72 | 79.50 | 13.57 | 0.20
1992 | Male | 10.64 | 61.29 | 25.43 | 2.65
     | Female | 7.23 | 78.12 | 14.37 | 0.32
1993 | Male | 10.42 | 61.60 | 25.33 | 2.65
     | Female | 7.03 | 77.55 | 15.10 | 0.32
1994 | Male | 10.11 | 61.83 | 25.45 | 2.61
     | Female | 6.77 | 77.42 | 15.46 | 0.35
1995 | Male | 10.22 | 61.63 | 25.57 | 2.59
     | Female | 6.63 | 74.75 | 18.24 | 0.38
1996 | Male | 10.01 | 61.10 | 26.29 | 2.60
     | Female | 6.65 | 73.75 | 19.18 | 0.42


Women face exclusion by governmental examinations from the bureaucratic positions in diplomacy, the diplomatic administrative, the central bank staff and so on. From various investigations shows the unequal restrictions upon women who are structurally excluded from the state’s bureaucracy. These constitutions of gender participation reflect the discussions of patriarchal structure found in Eisenstein’s (1979) and Walby’s (1997) works. These disadvantageous structures, as Santoro & McGuire (1997) claim, will lead to the failure of ‘insiders’ to support women’s political involvement in female labor policymaking of Taiwan.

Overall, the state did not positively push for the modifications of female labor conditions in their marginalized positions in the labor market structure and political participation. In the following, this study takes the other side to investigate the female organizational convergence and how they constructed their mutual supports in the involvement of female labor issues and legislations.

The Context and Convergence of Women’s Organizations

As discussed above, the state can be understood as an ‘administrative apparatus’, including a bureaucracy, with an ‘institutional legal order’ (Skocpol, 1985; Rhee, 1994). In addition, social structures and the political context have shaped the content of women’s involvement and encouraged their relative autonomy in the labor market and political structure (Walby, 1997). The shortcomings of female labor policy were considerably structuralized and influenced by weakening institutional arrangements, both within the state-controlled policy system and the interactive relationships between the state and female organizations.
Women’s subordination shows not only the continuity of traditional values and culture but it is also a product of patriarchal capitalism, in which the interests of the capitalists, the state, and the international market are served (Cheng and Hsiung, 1992). Salisbury’s (1973) and Gelb & Palley’s (1987) studies highlight the importance of leadership in the mobilization of previously unorganized interests. My investigation shows that The Awakening established a strong team of staff and a sound framework to support other women’s voluntary groups after the ending of Martial Law. However, the inevitable division of female organizations found in Huang’s (1995) and Wang’s (1999) research reveal that they are further divided by their immediate objective interests, and that the internal female organizations face different strategic disputations and internal divisions in the earlier developmental process of female movements. The disputations of discrepant routes and strategies are intensified by the lack of integration within female groups. The diversification of female organizations can be distinguished by their concern with female issues and formulated their various active strategies. The opinions of diverse organizations and scholars show their divergent strategies used by the leaders of these various labor-issues based female organizations. Therefore, various organizational barriers were constructed in the linkages between female labor organizations.

The development of female organizations depends on the external circumstances and internal strategies which generate the individual organizations’ developmental routes. Wilson (1993) and Baggott (1995) indicated that the internal conflicts either promote a renewed sense of integration within the group or damage their leadership to intensify a fragmented group. In the analysis, the divergent strategies used by different female organizations displayed some specifically structural meanings. Firstly, from the perspective of organizational differentiation, the distinction of organizational functions from multiple-issue to single-issue becomes a significant indicator of female organizational development and diversification in Taiwan. However, the development of single-issue female organizations shows that they have had to break through the given structural dilemma and concentrate on promoting their own issues, concerns and reforms. Overall, the flourishing of single-issue female labor organizations shows their discrepant developmental strategies, for example the construction of network relationships in cross-organizations or party mechanisms, and extends the spaces of negotiation for female labor issues. In Table 4 displays the development of female labor single-issue organizations in recent years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Issues of Concern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Organization Name</td>
<td>Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Taipei Female Employment Center</td>
<td>Assisting the female second wave of female employment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Fundamental Female Labor Center</td>
<td>Female workers’ job rights and health.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Female Workers’ United Production Line</td>
<td>Assisting female workers’ associations, disputation, and labor education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Fen-Ling Alliance</td>
<td>To eliminate the obstacles to female employment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Documents from the Above Four Organizational Announcements

The emergence of female labor single-issue organizations has created the diversification of the organizational active structure. However, the limitation of their internal resources has constrained their development, organizational mobilization and participatory involvement. Therefore, the barriers of internal limited resources led to female organizations having to construct the organizational linkages and structuralize their political constructions for women’s participation with another relevant female labor organization in Taiwan.

Due to the discrepant participatory structure, the developmental obstacles of women’s organizations are embedded not only in the long-term formulation and development of female organizations but also in the patriarchal governance structure. The ending of Martial Law enabled the emerging female organizations to tackle various women’s issues. By way of the emerging female events, female organizations mobilized their organizational resources and generated organizational linkages and involvements. Most of the female organizations jumped away from the party framework and their activities not only provided training services for female workers but also allowed them to involve in political reforms and legal modifications, thereby creating diverse pathways through which to change the unequal patriarchal structure of women in both the labor market and the political domain.

By way of the investigation of the Gender Equality in Employment Act event, this study provides the evidence how the female organizations throughout their strategic adjustment to successfully involve in the policy decision-making.

**The Strategic Involvement in the ‘Equal Employment Act’**

The enactment of the Equal Rights Amendment created a dependent relationship between diverse female groups in the USA. By contrast, by virtue of issues and interests, female labor organizations concentrated their strategies on constructing multiple network relationships with the relevant new labor organizations, as well as on transcending the structural constraints to accumulate their organizational resources in Taiwan. In Table 5 shows the sharp increase in female protests and coalitions after the ending of Martial Law. The shift of institutional restrictions
reinforced the involvement of female labor organizations and the integration of cross-organizations in Taiwan. These new female organizations were involved in advocacy, lobbying, litigation coalitions, and monitoring themselves in relation to clauses or issues from the administrative system to the legislative committee.

### Table 5  The Coalitions of Activities in Female Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Main Aims/ Events</th>
<th>Organizations Leading</th>
<th>Supporting Organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>A symposium on ‘the work rights of professional women’</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>A symposium on extending the scope of the Labor Standardization Law</td>
<td>The Awakening, seven labor organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>A reporters’ meeting about ‘the work rights of a memorial hall’</td>
<td>Lu Rong-Hai Lawyer</td>
<td>The Awakening, The Union Household</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>To display and protest the numbers who were fired in a memorial hall</td>
<td>The Awakening, The Union Household</td>
<td>The Institutions of Female Research and four labor organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>To continue to petition about the above to the Council Labor Association and the Executive Yuan</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td>The Union Household and four labor organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>To begin to lay down the ‘Equal Employment Bill’ draft</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>To present ‘the common declaration of maintaining women’s work rights’</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td>Unions, 34 female organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>To strive for the chance of pursuing further education</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td>Female organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>To present the summary of the Gender Equality in Employment Act</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>To protest against the leaders of unions who were fired for no reason</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td>Five labor organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>A symposium on ‘the dilemma of female workers’</td>
<td>Labor Branch Association</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>To present the conditions needed to recruit domestic female foreign workers</td>
<td>The Awakening, Basic Female Worker Center, and five female organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>To petition the Gender Equality in Employment Act in the Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>The Awakening and Basic Female Worker Center</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Female workers’ street assembly</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Activity Description</td>
<td>Organization(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>To participate against the exclusion of married women and prohibit pregnancy regulations</td>
<td>Fen-Ling Association and Female worker Association</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>To hold public hearing about the Gender Equality in Employment Act and provide a fifth modification</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>To protest for the work right of ’public prostitutes’</td>
<td>The Awakening, Female Organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>To complete the sixth revision of the Gender Equality in Employment Act</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>To prompt the Executive Yuan to modify the edition of the Gender Equality in Employment Act</td>
<td>The Awakening</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By virtue of their positive involvement, the Awakening, tried to modify the already decided labor policy of the central government. As Table 5 shows, most of their activities gradually generated the cooperative supports from other female groups in their concerning issues. We can see female labor organizations effectively integrate their diverse interests and construct their supportive network after the ending of Martial Law, especially in the Gender Equality in Employment Act.

The coalition and problem-solving activities of female groups were to be built upon their political efforts. In this context, the Gender Equality in Employment Act became the most significant labor issue in female organizational collective mobilizations and thus aimed to challenge the structural patriarchalism of the labor market and political participation. Overall, the action reveals an intensely powerful triangle of interactive relationships between the state, female organizations, and capitalists in the developmental process. By virtue of legislators presenting the drafts of the Gender Equality in Employment Act, the Awakening delivered the Gender Equality in Employment Act to the Legislative Yuan in 1990. Due to the party-state was afraid that female consciousness would generate an enormous impact upon the recruitment of the labor force and the rise of labor costs; additionally, the Gender Equality in Employment Act would intensify the capital immigration of the capitalists.

In addition, the committee of the Executive Yuan recognized that the contents of the draft excessively protected female workers and that the Gender Equality in Employment Act would influence the prominent investment wills of the capitalists. The possibility of impacts led to the postponement of the Gender Equality in Employment Act draft from 1990 to 1995 in the Legislative Yuan. However, the Legislative Yuan only passed the first clause of the draft and froze the draft for eight
years until 1998. The contextual development of the Gender Equality in Employment Act is shown in Table 6.

Table 6  Activities of the Gender Equality in Employment Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Relevant Activities of the Gender Equality in Employment Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>To finish the first draft of the Gender Equality in Employment Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>To hold on to the hearing of the Gender Equality in Employment Act and bring up the fifth modification of the Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>To hold a symposium about equal principles of gender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>To finish the sixth modification of the Bill and hold a symposium about the Gender Equality in Employment Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>To hold lobbying march and jointly sign their support to relevant legislators.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In light of investigation, it seems that the postponement of the Act was caused by two major structural factors, Firstly, the internal segregation of female organizations generated a lack of effective interaction and mobilization in their early stages of development. For example, the assertions of the Gender Equality in Employment Act included *equal opportunities* and *equal work* as two separate issues. Some of the female labor organizations (such as the Association of Wage-Earners) asserted the promotion of *equal opportunities* of the Gender Equality in Employment Act in advance of *equal work*. Moreover, some of the female organizations (such as The Awakening) were alleged to promote the combination of two parts of the Bill at the same time. As regards the putting into action of the Gender Equality in Employment Act, there were many internal conflicts and discrepant strategies existing between many-sided female organizations, and this fits with Wilson’s (1993) view that the internal conflicts will enhance the fragmentation of pressure groups.

Another significant factor can be recognized in the intensive opposition of the capitalists and the passive interventions of the central government in the process of policymaking. For instance, the Business and Industrial Associations enumerated the Gender Equality in Employment Act as ‘Ten Wicked Laws’ in recent years (Industrial and Business Newspaper, 1993) and they integrated many large enterprises to claim that the Gender Equality in Employment Act would generate a wide-scale ‘investment strike’. In this case, the capitalists’ associations passed through enormous organizational linkages in reaction to the promotion of the Gender Equality in Employment Act in the executive and legislative systems.

In Offe and Wiesenthal’s (1980) model of collective action, suggests the importance of the members’ ‘willingness to act’ and to be empowered by structural
releases and external supports. From 1987 to 1993, the political structural changes\textsuperscript{8} intensified the power of legislators, and so, the female labor organizations were inclined to seek the assistance of legislators in their concern with relevant issues. Overall, female organizations involved in lobbying activities in the executive system and legislators by way of their individual network organizational mobilization. The long-term active experiences of female organizations helped them to catch the relevant issues and negotiate with the relevant governmental sectors.

The segregation of female organizations enhanced the resource fragmentation between various female organizations in the earlier developmental stage. However, from 1993 to 1999, the Awakening continually modified the sixth edition of the Gender Equality in Employment Act to interlock with relevant female organizations in the legislative system. In the same time, various female labor organizations gradually understand their limited resource of internal development in the recent years. In addition, the Council Labor Association responded to their request and provided an official edition of the Gender Equality in Employment Act in 1999\textsuperscript{9} under the long-term protests by the female organizations. As Sabatier’s (1993) studies have shown that the shifts in socio-economic conditions were combined with the work of these potential members of long-term advocacy coalitions. The long-term activities of the Gender Equality in Employment Act reveal common policy beliefs in the leaders of the female organizations and coordinated activity in pursuit of their common policy objectives in female labor fields.

Kent’s (1990) research shows the influence of gender orientation upon political attitudes and indicates that women were inclined to support the female candidates and female organizations. In the participatory structure of the Legislative Yuan, the numbers of legislators supporting the Gender Equality in Employment Act had grown to 30 and this situation created an advantageous condition to promote the Gender Equality in Employment Act in the Legislative Yuan. The organizational mobilization and integration of female organizations enhanced the initial successful promotion of the Gender Equality in Employment Act in the labor policymaking

\textsuperscript{8} The political structural changes include the ending of senior legislators who moved from Mainland China in 1949 and the re-election of legislators which enhanced their representativeness in 1989. They were positively empowered in their actions in the relevant legislative agenda. The other reason was the adjustment of the constitutive structure. The Legislative Yuan became the most powerful central representative. The political changes used the power of the ‘assembly representative’ to make them powerless. By contrast, the expansion of power to legislators enhanced the influence of their functional positions.

\textsuperscript{9} The female organizations strictly supervised and arranged the entry of two editions of the Gender Equality in Employment Act (The Awakening and the Council Labor Association) into the committee of the Executive Yuan. In 1999, the Gender Equality in Employment Act passed through the political consultation and diverse departmental examinations of the Executive Yuan.
process of Taiwan. Female legislators have been inclined to support and involve in the female related labor legislation. The structural analysis of the Legislative Yuan shows the period from 1995 to 1998 to see a rapid rise in the number of female legislators. The rate restructured the advantageous circumstances needed for joint political action on female labor policies in the legislative system.

Table 7  The Proportion of Female Legislators in Successive Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Numbers</th>
<th>Female Numbers</th>
<th>Rate of Female Legislator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The linkages of issue network created the effect of the networks relationships within the process of organizational integration. Overall, female labor organizations became involved in the female labor policymaking process by two pathways. First, under the positive coalition of the Awakening, female labor organizations integrated their limited resources to narrow down their issues and events (as the Gender Equality in Employment Act). Most of the lobbying action transcended their boundaries of strategic distinction and this flexible strategy was conducive to extending their collective action in lobbying legislators about women’s labor issues. Their collective actions involved the continual lobbying and integrated relevant supportive groups in their activities. Secondly, they concentrated on supporting their intimate legislators into the Legislative Yuan. They used the electoral system, for example, to support designated candidates or to recommend internal members as candidates, in order to achieve their multiple organizational objectives. The relevant legislators and female legislators created an advantageous legislative structure to influence the legislation of female labor policymaking.

Overall, the strategies of female labor organizations generated the more flexible space and time to negotiate with the central government. In comparison with the patterns of female labor policymaking in the previous period, we can identify the later period as follows. Firstly, the unequal employment opportunities in terms of gender were, and remain, a patriarchal structure in both of the labor market and the hierarchical government. Secondly, the construction of the patriarchal state in the
traditional private-public division of work and the deficient support system made it difficult for female workers to enter or re-enter the labor market. Thirdly, the low level female participation in the trade unions and the bureaucratic government generated structural constraints in female policymaking. Fourthly, alongside the release of political structure, female labor organizations formulated their collective participation in the Gender Equality in Employment Act event which created the integration of female organizational support across their boundaries. This flexible strategy of the Gender Equality in Employment Act event constructed systematic linkages within female labor organizations and they positively communicated with legislators to allow the advantageous negotiation of policymaking circumstances.

Conclusion

The domain of governance structure was extended from the strict constraints of the party-military state to state-society relationships, however, the state still holds the dominant role in the process of labor policymaking. This significant construction has been sought not only to focus on specific public policies but also to transform the power relationships and interactive structures that exist between the state and civil society. Therefore, the historical development from authoritarian to democratic governments is somewhat different from the fragmentation of political authority and such a plurality of centers of policymaking makes it difficult to pursue coherent policymaking in female labor policy.

This study has examined the governance and the interactive structure between diverse organizations and sectors in the development of female labor policy. The investigations have showed that the mechanism of strategic intervention was very important to restructuralize the interactive structure in the process of labor policymaking. The strategic intervention of the state embedded in three contexts: firstly, the state held the dominant role which can transcend the symbiotic relationship and adjusts the advantageous balance of the prominent labor policymaking process. As Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) argued, the state may have a role as a mediator, balancer and harmonizer of different societal interests. Secondly, the rapid expansion of the state’s bureaucracy has led to a lack of its ability to manipulate the hierarchical executive and legislative systems. Hirst and Thompson (1999) and Castells (2000) suggested the state needs more power to stabilize the mechanisms of democratic development and bureaucratic extension. Finally, diverse disputes and protests have arisen from the relevant female organizations and labor organizations. The restructuring of the state develops relationships of strategic coordination (Jessop, 1999) with the relevant organizations and the type of strategic adjustment is decided by the prominence of labor policies, time and space. However,
the state has still played an arbitrator or mediator between the relevant interested organizations, and it chooses a suitable time to maintain its developmental interests.

After the ending of Martial Law, Taiwan faced a number of impacts and proceeded to the process of democratization. The development of female labor policymaking suggested that there were different constraints in the interactive structure in the later watershed period. Firstly, the strong intervention and institutional regulations of the state enhanced the various female organizations formulated the strategic alliance. Secondly, even though there was some serious segregation between the different female organizations, however, by way of the involvements of event construct the organizational linkages in the prominent female labor issues. Thirdly, female labor organizations attempted to transcend the political framework of their oppositional movements. In Randall’s (1987) investigation of female movements shows, the strategy of deradicalization has become a major pathway of adaptive adjustment in Western female organizations. Under the context of deradicalization, most of the organizational alliances were inclined to follow legitimate pathways to involve in issues of individual concern in Taiwan.

Overall, Janicke (1990) points to the ‘functional failure of the state’, in that the state apparatus included a complicated bureaucratic system which was combined with hierarchical sectors, this meant that as Zeitlin’s (1985) study indicated, inevitable internal conflicts arose in the relevant departments of the central government. Thus the processes of female labor policymaking still retained a highly complicated process of coordination between the internal subsystem structures of the hierarchical bureaucracy. At the national level, the internal conflicts of the hierarchical government and the organizational issues linkages of civil society restructuralize the governance structure in the latter period of Taiwan. Therefore, we could not examine the ability of the state only in terms of its policy outcomes, it is easy to misperceive the state as either weak or strong and thus to misinterpret the function of adaptive adjustments in the process of female labor policymaking.

From the investigation of the state’s regulations, the patriarchal gender segmentation of labor participation and exclusion of political participation is still evident in labor market, in that the state neglects unequal wages and is reluctant to promote significant female labor legislation in the field of female labor. This study has demonstrated how the variant structures of the newly mobilized relevant female labor organizations have come to be significant in contemporary Taiwanese society. The empirical investigations show that structural contradictions are still embedded in the oppositional structures of the process in female labor policymaking. The empowerment of the relevant organizations helps them to articulate their resource mobilization and to restructuralize the symbiotic relations between the state and the
capitalists. As Winckler (1984) indicated a transition of the state from a hard to a soft authoritarian mode of governance structure. While the impact of this has weakened the corporatist control of Kuo-Min party, requiring it to change its labor control policy, the outcome has not been the unequivocal promotion of labor interests. The empirical investigation simultaneously shows the state has had to make strategic interventions and to develop adaptive corporations with the relevant interest organizations under the continued impacts in some labor policymaking.

Finally, drawing on Gelb’s (1987) ideas, we can see that the structure of potential organizations may be supplemented to account for the organizational role of social groups in different countries. Table 8 shows the comparison of these with Taiwan’s organizations in terms of various dimensions.

Table 8  The Structure and Potential Role of Social Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>U.K.</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Strong labor unions</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Strong political parties</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Strong promotional interest groups (change-oriented)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Women’s section in parties/unions</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Independent women’s liberation group</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Pluralist system</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) Politicized bureaucracy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: -- is limited; + is important; ++ is very important.*

These structural characteristics are formulated by the difficulty in flourishing of pressure groups in Taiwan’s civil society. The Gender Equality in Employment Act case study indicates the organizational involvements and network linkages between various female organizations and relevant organizations. Overall, the state has designed the strategic coordination of the various institutional pathways in order to incorporate the diverse pressure groups into the governance structure in Taiwan. However, the lack of ‘policy brokers’ buffer and harmonize the oppositional conflicts which arise in the diverse sectors.
Acknowledgement

* This paper had presented in the conference of the NATSA (North American Taiwan Studies Association). Many thanks for suggestions from discussants were helpful in the revised work.

References


of Sociology, 50 (1998), 118-140.


